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Abstract
This paper analyzes the causes that led to the federal indictment of thirteen female guards,
and eventual conviction of forty guards and inmates, at the Baltimore City Detention
Center in 2013. The analysis is based on information presented in extensive newspaper
coverage during and after the discovery of the events and the behavior at the jail. While
popular opinion in the press blamed the guards’ gender or their personal morals for their
actions, the incident can best be explained through the use of organizational heuristic
tools. Application of Diane Vaughan’s matrix of routine nonconformity reveals that the
guards’ actions involved multiple layers of misconduct within an organizational setting
and that the failures were not individual but structural.
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In 2013, thirteen female correctional officers at the Baltimore City Detention
Center were indicted under federal racketeering charges. The charges against these
officers spiraled into a minor scandal as over two dozen other officers and inmates were
also charged. By 2015, forty people were convicted for their involvement. Speculation
rose about how, exactly, the prison could allow the widespread corruption to happen, with
theories blaming the gender and moral character of the guards. However, the epidemic
of corruption can best be explained through an organizational context. Organizational
sociologist Diane Vaughan (1999) typifies organizational deviance in one of three forms:
mistake, misconduct, and disaster. Each of these three forms is characterized by routine
nonconformity, or regularly-occurring deviances from the organizational norms, but
they are differentiated by the intention of the actors involved and the level of resulting
widespread harm. Mistakes, misconduct, and disasters are all shaped by the micro, meso,
and macro levels of the organization in which they occur. In the case of the Baltimore City
Detention Center, the guards’ actions were acts of misconduct, and Vaughan’s matrix of
routine nonconformity is the best fit to explain how that misconduct occurred.

Case Analysis
The officers, along with several inmates at the Baltimore City Detention Center, were
accused of helping the criminal gang Black Guerilla Family (BGF) “run their criminal
enterprise in jail by smuggling cellphones, prescription pills and other contraband in their
underwear, shoes and hair” (Marimow and Wagner 2013). The scheme was led by Tavon
White, the gang’s leader, who was incarcerated for attempted murder and who at one
point boasted on a wiretapped phone call that “this is my jail” (Anderson 2015). White
led the BGF in the prison and colluded with the guards, even impregnating five of them.
Ultimately, twenty-four officers and sixteen inmates were convicted of involvement,
and only three officers were acquitted (Jedra 2015). After the allegations came to light,
Maryland state officials attempted to deflect blame: Senator Lisa Gladden said that the
female guards were the problem; Secretary of Public Safety Gary D. Maynard called
the guards involved “bad actors” (Marimow and Wagner 2013). However, both of these
explanations fail to account for the organizational aspect of the situation. The events in
the prison were rooted in organized crime and led to the guards participating in White’s
racketeering scheme. While the acts were intended to conform to White’s gang and his
standards, the guards’ status caused the general public to see them as deviants. Their
misconduct led to the entire prison being labeled as deviant and ultimately caused the
facility to shut down.
The BGF, a highly structured organized crime gang, was founded in the 1960s in
California, but has expanded to operate in major U.S. cities and prisons across the nation
(Marimow and Wagner 2013). Tavon White’s position within the gang is indicative of
internal organization: he is “allegedly a high-ranking ‘bushman’ in the Black Guerilla
Family” (Vargas, Marimow, and Shin 2013). White also organized the internal structure
of the prison so that he was on top. He created a money laundering and racketeering
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operation, complete with an appointed “minister of finance,” and said at one point that
“‘I make every final call in this jail… everything come[s] to me’” (Vargas, et al.:2013).
White leveraged his personal charisma and his long stay in the prison to restructure the
prison. Rather than existing as a regular inmate, he organized the internal hierarchy and
put himself on top.
White’s organized crime operation within the prison provided the backdrop
for the misconduct committed by the guards. Misconduct can be defined as “acts of
omission or commission by individuals or groups acting in their organizational roles
who violate internal rules, laws or administrative regulations on behalf of organizational
goals” (Vaughan 1999:287). The case initially charged thirteen guards at the prison, but
these charges were later expanded to twenty-seven guards (Jedra 2015). These guards
were acting on the behalf of two organizations: the formal prison and the informal
gang. They leveraged their roles within the the prison in order to improve their standing
with White and the BGF. In essence, they violated the rules of the prison and of their
jobs on behalf of the goals of the illicit organization. The guards’ offenses ranged from
smuggling contraband into prison to having sexual relations with inmates to warning
inmates before their cells were searched (Marimow and Wagner 2013). In return,
all of the guards were paid, allowed to drive cars belonging to the gang, and several
of them entered relationships with White (Marimow and Wagner 2013). The guards
violated the rules of the prison while simultaneously following the rules of the BGF.
This combination of conformity and nonconformity resulted ultimately in the guards
committing misconduct.
Within Albert Reiss’s (1984) typology of labeling organizational deviance,
the actions of the guards resulted in the entire prison being labeled deviant. While the
corruption was not universal, it was widespread enough that the guards’ corruption
came to symbolize a corrupt prison as a whole. The prison remained open, but several
of the guards were transferred to other prisons because they were labeled as “dirty”
(Washington Post 2013). After his election in 2015, Maryland Governor Larry Hogan
announced that he would be closing the prison, calling the entire incident “one of the
biggest failures of leadership in the history of Maryland” (Connelly 2015). Hogan did
not acknowledge the guards who were not complicit in the racketeering, stating only
that the prisoners would be transferred to other facilities in the state. While the involved
guards were convicted individually, the entire facility suffered the consequences of their
actions. Hogan demolished the prison in 2016 and has not yet announced plans to build
a replacement facility (Cox and George 2017). The complete history and faculty of the
prison were tainted by the actions of the guards involved with the BGF.
The guards’ misconduct and participation in organized crime led to the Baltimore City
Detention Center being labeled as deviant. Forty of the forty-four individuals charged in
the case were convicted, and the prison was closed and demolished. The organizational
foci on crime led to a more comprehensive understanding of the events that took place
within the prison. The context of both of the organizations involved shines a new light
on the guards’ and White’s behavior.
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Causes
After the indictment was made public, the prison was heavily criticized for allowing
women to serve as guards. Senator Lisa Gladden argued that “‘when you hire and seek
women to handle men, you get all sorts of crazy stuff … you cannot allow women to
get involved with these men, or you’re going to get what you’re going to get’” (Duncan
2013). However, in 2013, more than 60% of prison guards in Baltimore were women
(Dvorak 2013). The problem was not that the guards were women; rather, the problem
was the power imbalance. Women have the same capacity as men to wield their power
dangerously, and while “‘there’s an assumption that women won’t [abuse their power],
can’t do this, that it’s not in our nature … but it’s in our nature’” (Dvorak 2013). While
women statistically commit fewer crimes than men, “the notion that women are more
ethical, generous, and caring than men in the public sphere is questionable” (Dodge
2012:92). Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that “societal structures have
limited the types of criminal offenses committed by women” (Dodge 2012:86). Because
the majority of prison guards in Baltimore were women who did not abuse their power,
the gender of the guards at the detention center cannot be definitively linked to their
misconduct. Instead, the characteristics of the organization’s structure and environment,
and indeed the failure of both of these aspects, are the roots of the misconduct that
occurred in the detention center.
One of the key factors in the events at the Baltimore City Detention Center was
the failure of regulations. The guards’ misconduct was affected by the environment in
which it took place. When the environmental deterrence fails, Vaughan (1999) argues that
misconduct becomes significantly easier. Complex systems such as prison hierarchies have
failsafes in place: “a safety device, a redundancy” (Perrow 1984:6). These failsafes are part
of the external environment and are designed to prevent misconduct and other forms of
organizational deviance. The detention center suffered from a failure of these redundancies.
For example, the guards were able to sneak contraband into the prison because the external
security checkpoints did not perform their checks thoroughly: “[the guards] underwent
pat-downs that were cursory at best, and much of the contraband, especially the drugs, did
not trigger the metal detectors at the entrance” (Washington Post 2013). It was assumed
that the guards would follow their duties, but in the event that they committed acts of
misconduct, the security checkpoints existed as a redundancy. However, that regulation
failed because of the cursory nature of the pat-downs. The checkpoints became steeped
in familiarity and routine. That familiarity can become detrimental because it “means that
we are not endlessly alert, ever searching for that extremely rare event [that indicates a
system failure]” (Perrow 1984:152). The prison’s gatekeepers became too familiar with
the process, and that prevented them from properly regulating the prison guards. This
regulatory failure allowed the problem to spiral out of control.
The misconduct was also worsened by the failure of institutional sanctions.
Organizational characteristics are another key factor in determining the causes of
organizational deviance, and the lack of sanctions is one such characteristic. The guards
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involved in the scheme “faced no realistic prospect of punishment” (Washington Post
2013). The majority of the guards involved were not punished, only transferred to other
prisons. The failure to institute proper sanctions against the prison guards drew ire from
critics, who claimed that “dirty guards should be fired, not transferred” (Washington
Post 2013). If the guards knew that they would not be severely punished for their
actions, the sanctions became less efficient as deterrents. This is another example of a
redundancy failing. The threat of punishment or losing jobs should serve as a deterrent
against deviance. Instead, the guards had an excess of autonomy, which allowed them
to make decisions with a lessened fear of repercussion. The failure of sanctions, and the
excess of organizational autonomy, contributed to the scheme.

Eﬀects
The Baltimore City Detention Center was closed in 2015; two years later, it was evident
that there were no plans to replace it (Cox and George 2017). Most of the guards were
transferred until their trials began. One inmate died before charges could be pressed; the
remaining twenty-four guards and sixteen inmates were convicted in the scheme (Jedra
2015). However, at the time of the indictment, four of the guards had children with Tavon
White, and all of the prisoners were transferred to other detention centers within the state.
Despite the internalized nature of the crime, the actions of the guards still had victims.
Most of the victims of the events in the detention center were third and fourth
party victims. Third-party victims are characterized as “innocent bystanders” with no
involvement in the system (Perrow 1984:68). While the prisoners housed at the Baltimore
City Detention Center were not innocent, they were affected by the actions of the BGF
and everyone involved in it. The inmates that actively participated were convicted,
and those that did not were relocated. These uninvolved suffered the consequences of
the misconduct of the guards and inmates. The children of the guards and White were
fourth-party victims. Their lives were impacted by the actions of their parents, in which
they had no say whatsoever. This deviance determined the course of their lives, and
the effects of the BGF on them should be acknowledged. The children and the inmates
comprise the victim population following the events at the detention center.

Evaluation
The best theoretical fit for the events in the detention center is Vaughan’s matrix of routine
nonconformity. Vaughan’s initial typology of mistake, misconduct, and disaster makes
it clear that the problems in the prison were misconduct: they could not have occurred
without actions taken intentionally by the prison guards. Analyzing the environment
and organizational characteristics provides additional context for the misconduct that
elucidates the guards’ decisions. Gender-based theories of crime do not fit here because
the actions taken by the female guards here are not dissimilar to actions taken by male
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guards in similar positions. The administrative failures that led to the misconduct within
the prison were criticized by journalists, by the public, and by Maryland Governor Larry
Hogan. The lack of regulation was the strongest influence in the case of the Baltimore
City Detention Center.

Conclusion
Vaughan’s model of routine nonconformity explains not only the actions within the
Baltimore City Detention Center, but also how they were able to take place. The excess
of autonomy within the prison and failure of regulation created an environment where
deviance would not be punished. The racketeering scheme had far-reaching consequences,
including the birth of illegitimate children and the relocation of dozens of prisoners.
While the deviance may at a glance seem to be because of the women’s gender or
because of their individual greed, their actions were abetted by structural characteristics
that fostered deviance. The ultimate closure of the Baltimore City Detention Center
and conviction of forty guards and inmates may have punished the offenders, but a
repetition of this situation can only be avoided by examining and learning from these
institutional failures. These organizational failures must be analyzed and eliminated in
order to prevent another case like this.
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